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CLAIM OF TITLE
Claim of freehold had no place in Littleton's definition of disseisin,
6
and Coke in his commentary mentions entry and a claimer, or taking of
profits merely to emphasize that entry alone was not sufficient, but that
there had to be an ouster also.
87  Claim of freehold might be Important
in turning into a disseisin what might otherwise be a mere trespass,
such as the raising of crops on another's land"" or an entry made in his
absence,89 but the importance of claim of freehold in this connection
was rather to extend the scope of disseisin, than to limit it, and was
much greater in the time when the line between trespass and the assize
of novel disseisin was sharply drawn
90 than later."- That was the time
however of Bracton and Britton and Fleta, and what they had to say on
this was quoted by Coke,
92 and found its way in a free translation but as
a quotation from Coke on Littleton into Croke's report of the case of
Blunden v. Baugh.93  There it was said "for, as Co. Lit. 153 b defines,
'A disseisin is where one enters, intending to usurp the possession, and
to oust another of his freehold.'" According to this a disseisin, other
than a disseisin at election, had to be intended; it could not be by ignor-
ance or mistake. This found acceptance in the later cases,
94 but they
were cases involving the invalidity of transfers by a disseisee and not
the statute of limitations. It remained for the American cases to make
the application to the statute.
9 5
That no claim of freehold was necessary to the disseisor found expres-
sion in the maxim that a wrongdoer could not qualify his own wrong.
Littleton indeed would not have made one a disseisor who of his own
head occupied lands claiming to hold them at the will of the free-
holder,9  but Coke insisted that in such a case he was a disseisor if he
entered of his own head and restricted Littleton's statement to the case
* Continued from the November number, 33 Y.LE LAw JouRNAL, 1-13.
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of the hold-over tenant, the tenant at sufferance.97 Nor did the fact
that the wrongful possessor claimed a term for years, or a term for life
or a fee tail, make him less a disseisor in fee simple,98 unless possibly
the limited estate which he claimed was in existence, although not belong-
ing to him.99 If the claim of less than a freehold had rendered the
possessor nothing but a disseisor at election, this would have meant that
he was a disseisor for the sake of the remedy only, 00 and would have
been relatively unimportant, but he was not such to Coke, 10' and in his
principal treatment of the matter was not such to Preston.102 However,
the cases where the maxim that the wrongdoer could not qualify his
own wrong was applied to one claiming less than a freehold, other than
where the remedy only was involved, usually concerned the sufficiency of
a possession to support a release and like matters pertaining to the old
conveyancing, and in no instance seem to have involved the statute of
limitations.
If claim of freehold played little part in restricting the scope of
disseisin, it was quite otherwise of the character in which the posses-
sion of the land had been taken. As long as the assize of novel
disseisin had remained a popular remedy, the tendency had been to
enlarge its scope and, although a statute was necessary to make this
clear, a tortious feoffment by a tenant of less than a fee came to be
regarded as a disseisin.103 But the popularity of the assize ceased in the
fifteenth century,' 04 and the limitations that disseisin put on convey-
ancing and the hardship of one's entry being cut off by a descent cast
reacted against disseisin. First, the hold-over tenant was made a
tenant at sufferance, to distinguish him from a disseisor, 0 5 then a
tenant at will who made a lease for years without any intention of
ousting the freeholder was made a disseisor at election instead of an
actual disseisor, 0 1 and this doctrine of disseisin at election was extended
by Lord Mansfield to the bare possessor who made a tortious feoff-
ment.107 In fact Lord Mansfield would have made anyone a disseisor
- Coke, Littleton, *271 a. That Coke interpreted Littleton too narrowly see
2 Preston, Conveyancing (i8o6) 304, 312.
us2 Preston, Conveyancing, 313; 2 ibid., Abstracts of Title (2d ed. 1824) 293;
Hob. 323; Norwich v. Johnson (1683, C. P.) 3 Lev. 35.
"2 Preston, Conveyancing, 315, 317 et seq.; Norwich v. Johnson, supra
note 98.
1002 Preston, Abstracts of Title (2d ed. 1824) 286, 389.
1 Coke, Littleton, *271 a. The very great extension of the doctr:ine of disseisin
at election in modern times dates from the case of Blunden v. Baugh (1632,
K. B.) Cro. Car. 3o2, and therefore is later than Coke.
1022 Preston, Abstracts of Title (2d ed. 1824) 293 et seq. But see ibid. 390.
032 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed. 1899) 54.
" Sir Matthew Hale, Common Law (4th ed. 1792) 176.
'"Bordwell, Seisin and Disseisin (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 592, 62o.
'Blunden v. Baugh (1632, K. B.) Cro. Car. 302. See also Bordwell, op. cit.
supra note io5, at p. 621.
' Taylor d. Atkyns v. Horde (I757, K. B.) i Burr. 6o.
DISSEISIN AND ADVERSE POSSESSION
at election who was subject to ejectment without an actual entry, and
confined actual disseisin to the case where one held under a proper fine
with proclamations. 08 However this may have been, the possibility of
disseisin by one who had entered as tenant, unless he had come to the
tenancy by act of law, 0 9 seems to have been confined to the case of the
improper delivery of the possession by the tenant to a stranger. He
might subject his estate to forfeiture by matter of record as by denying
his landlord's title or by attorning to a stranger,"x0 but these acts do not
seem to have been deemed disseisins."'1 The payment of the rent to a
stranger might be a disseisin at the election of the lord, but that was
all. 1 2 And the law applicable to tenants was applied to cases where
the law made out a tenancy at will as in the case of the mortgagor, 1 3 the
cestui que trust"4 and the feoffee who entered before livery., 5 Further-
more the doctrine of descent cast did not apply in the case of the
younger brother who entered before the heir,"6 and for one owner in
common to disseise another there had to be an actual ouster, a bare
perception of the profits, and a denial of his moiety of them to the
... Ibid. 107-113. See also Bordwell, op. cit. supra note 1oS, at p. 621.
"Coke, Littleton, *271 a. This was an adaption by Coke of the doctrine of
trespass ab initio to disseisin.
" Coke, Littleton, *251 a, b, *252 a.
'Doe v. Danvers (i8o6, K. B.) 7 East, 299, 321; Lightwood, Possession,
50, 164.
'Secs. 588, 589; Lightwood, Possession, 51.
' Snmartle v. Williams (1694, K. B.) i Salk. 245; Leman v. Newnham (1747,
Ch.) i Ves. Sen. 51; Lightwood, Possession, 161.
" The law seemed somewhat more ready to find a disseisin by a cestui que
trust of the trustee than by a mortgagor of the mortgagee in that an unauthorized
lease for years by the former was held to be a disseisin (Freeman v. Banes
[167o, K. B.] i Vent. 80) while perhaps nothing but a tortious feoffment would
have been considered a disseisin on the part of the mortgagor (2 Preston,
Abstracts of Title [2d ed. 1824] 365), but either of these cases involved an
improper delivery of the possession to a stranger and although Lord Hardwicke
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done "acts of ownership throughout" a disseisor (Portsmouth v. Efinglwm [1750,
Ch.] i Ves. Sen. 430, 435), this was still doubtful in 1831 (Fausset v. Carpenter
[1831, H. L.] 2 Dow & Cl. 232, 243).
"Littleton, Tenures, *7o. A difference was taken by Coke between "a grant
made by agreement of the parties which stands not with the rules of law, and
which never can by any subsequent act, as by livery, or attornment, be made
good, and a grant good at the beginning, but to have its perfection by a subse-
quent ceremony." Bucklers Case (I598, C. P.) 2 Co. Rep. 55 a, 55 b. One
entering under color of the former was a disseisor, under the latter a tenant
at will. One entering under a conveyance invalid because of the statutes of
frauds was also a tenant at will, (1677) 29 Car. II, c. 3, sec. i. If long posses-
sion had counted for nothing in these constructive tenancies at will it is obvious
that there would have been great hardship and so the law resorted to a presump-
tion of a grant or reconveyance. In Rees v. Lloyd (1811, Exch.) Wightwick,
123, Macdonald, C. B., said that in his opinion livery should be presumed after
twenty years on analogy to the statute.
"Littleton, Tenures, *396.
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other was not sufficient.
117  And although one owner in common
entered claiming the whole he was said to be in by right rather than by
wrong.11 And while the cestui que trust was considered for some
purposes as having an equitable seisin, Lord Hardwicke refused to
consider one who entered claiming to be cestui as an equitable
disseisor."19
The confusion into which Lord Mansfield had thrown the whole
matter of disseisin by his sweeping extension of disseisin at election
20
is manifest in the writings of even so logical a thinker 
as Preston.m 21
Had Lord Mansfield's doctrine been carried over in its, fullness from
the law of conveyancing to the limitation of actions and the statute of
limitations of James I held not to run where there was merely a disseisin
at election in his broad sense of the term, that statute mdght just as well
have been wiped off the books as far as the limitation of entries on land
was concerned and the field left for the statute of fines and the other
statutes of limitations. 2 2 No doubt he had no intention of making any
such radical change in the limitation of actions, but it is not surprising
that when he offered adverse possession as a substitute for disseisin it
should have been eagerly seized upon.
However, adverse possession might well have made its own way, even
though disseisin had not been in such disfavor. It was the logical
outcome of the change in the action of ejectment from an action based
on an ouster to an action based on a detention of possession. In so far
as ejectment remained a tort action at all, it was the withholding of
possession that constituted the cause of action, and not the manner in
which that possession was gained. Ouster no longer remained a
principal fact except in so far as it remained such in connection with
the statute of limitations.1S The anomaly was presented of having the
limitation of a cause of action depend upon the limitation of something
quite remote from that cause of action. That the limitation of the
action should have been more and more affected by the character which
the action had' now assumed would seem, as Langdell says, to have been
almost inevitable.12 ' It was much more natural to make the running
T Reading v. Royston (I702, Q. B.) 2 Salk. 423.
" Snales v. Dale (1614, K. B.) Hob. i2o; but see Coke, Littleton, *243 b.
'Hopkins v. Hopkins (1738, Ch.) i Atk. 581, 591; 2 Preston, Abstracts of
Title, (2d ed. 1824) 368; but see Llewellin v. Mackworth (174o, Ch.) Barn. C.
445, 449.
'Pollock and Wright, Possession (i888) go; Maitland, The Mystery of
Seisin (i886) 2 LAw Q. Rxv. 481, 488 note 3.
'For example, he gives Coke's man who "entereth into land of his own
wrong .... to hold it at the will of the owner" in one place (2 Abstracts of
Title [2d ed. 1824] 294) as an example of a disseisor of necessity, while in
another (2 Conveyancing, 304) he refers to him as a disseisor at election only.
See also ibid. 311.
" Ballantine, Statute of Limitations (I812) 21.
'Pollock and Wright, Possession (i888) 85.
"'Equity Pleading, see. 123.
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of the statute depend upon the withholding of possession for twenty
years, than on an ouster which except for that statute had come to be a
mere fiction. It would have been natural to have gone even further,
and made any possession which would have subjected one to the action
sufficient to have set the statute running, and this was what was done
in Doe d. Parker v. Gregory,1 25 but after all it was only indirectly that
the statute of James I affected the action of ejectment and liability to an
ejectmer-t for twenty years had not become the accepted test for the
running of the statute at the time of its repeal. Even Lord Mansfield
could use disseisin in one breath and adverse possession in the other,1 26
and the old law of disseisin in so far as it concerned the statute of
limitation was not so much changed as stated in terms of adverse
possession. Thus the possession of the younger brother was accounted
the possession of the heir, 27 the possession of one co-owner accounted
the possession of the others, 28 the possession of the tenant that of the
landlord,'1 29 of the mortgagor that of the mortgagee,2 0 of the cestui que
trust that of the trustee.'2 ' The restatement of the law, however, was
not without its effect. In the case of the mortgagor and the cestui que
trust the inference that their possession was deemed to be that of the
mortgagee and trustee was only a presumption that might be overcome
by showing a repudiation of the relationship by the mortgagor8 2 and
cestui133 From then on their possession was adverse. And Lord
Redesdale was of the opinion that the possession of a tenant might
become adverse by notice brought home to the landlord of his attorn-
ment to a stranger.' In the case of the co-owner it was also held that
his possession might become adverse by a refusal to pay the moiety of
the profits to the other under claim of title to the whole.'3 5 In the case
of the tenant pur auter vie holding over after the death of the cestui que
vie Lord Mansfield made a square departure from the old law in holding
that he might be an adverse possessor,8 6 and this was followed in Doe v.
(1834, K. B.) 2 Ad. & E. 14.
"'Fairclaim v. Shackleton (177o, K. B.) 5 Burr. 26o4, 26o7.
i Cruise, Digest (ist Am. ed. i8o8) I4.
"This had been said of joint-tenants as early as 87o4. Ford v. Grey (1704,
. B.) i Salk. 285.
' Saunders v. Lord Annesley (88o4, Ir. Ch.) 2 Sch. & Lef. 73, 98.
"Lernan v. Newnham (1747, Ch.) i Ves. Sen. 51.
"IPomfret v. Windsor (752, Ch.) 2 Ves. Sen. 472, 481.
"Hall v. Doe (1822, K. B.) 5 Barn & Ald. 687; Doe v. Williams (1836, K. B.)
5 Ad. & E. 291; Lightwood, Possession, 165.
'Fausset v. Carpenter (1831, H. L.) 2 Dow & CI. 232, 243.
"'Hovenden v. Lord Annesley (i8o5, Ir. Ch.) 2 Sch. & Lef. 6o7, 624; Light-
wood, Possession, 166.
'Doe v. Prosser (1774, K. B.) I Cowp. 217; Lightwood, Possession, 66.
'Ibid. Lord Mansfield said: "A man may come in by a rightful possession,
and yet hold over adversely without a title . . . . For instance, length of
possession, during a particular estate, as a term of one thousand years, or under
a lease for lives, as long as the lives are in being gives no title; but if tenant
pur antre vie hold over for 2o years after the death of the cestui que vie, such
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Gregory"37 on ground so broad that it would have substituted liability to
ejectment for disseisin as the test for the running of the statute.
Adverse possession was also held to work in favor of one claiming an
equity of redemption against the original mortgagor.
138 Whether this
would have been extended to other equities than the equity of redemp-
tion was left unsettled by the House of Lords 
1 9
The English Act of 1833140 was strongest on its destructive side, the
abolition of the old real actions with their varying periods of limita-
tion,14' the elimination of disseisin,142 descent cast,'
43 continual claim, 44
and the artificial character of right of possession and right of property
which disappeared once the old system was gone.'
45 On its positive
side it was a composite of the views which had been expressed by Lords
Mansfield, Redesdale and Sir Thomas Plumer and of the view expressed
the following year by Lord Denman in Doe v. Gregory. It applied
directly to the action of ejectment and ran whenever one had subjected
himself to the action, but instead of making the withholding of posses-
sion the test of the running of the statute, it provided that the statute
should run from the time of dispossession or discontinuance of posses-
sion, and hence continued the anomaly of making the limitation of a
cause of action depend upon the limitation of something quite apart
from that cause of action. 48  Furthermore in stressing the loss of
possession rather than the withholding of possession it failed to grasp,
or at least failed to adopt, Lord Mansfield's theory of adverse possession
as a positive prescription.147  It has accordingly been severely
criticised.1 48  But it had the merit of adopting in detail many of the
suggestions made by the more progressive judges. It made the statute
run wherever one had subjected himself to an action of ejectment.'
49
holding over will in ejectment be a complete bar to the remainderman or
reversioner; because it was adverse to his title."
(3834, K. B.) 2 Ad. & E. 14; Lightwood, Possession, 162.
Cholmondeley v. Clinton (i82o, Ch.) 2 Jac. & W. 1, 175 et seq. The Master
of the Rolls, Sir Thomas Plumer, would have gone further than this and applied
the same doctrine to equities in general. Ibid. 145 et seq.
' S. c. (1821, H. L.) 4 Bligh, i. For a very clear account of the celebrated
case of Cholmondeley v. Clinton, see Lightwood, Possession, 168.
1403 & 4 Wm. IV, C. 27.
' Sec. 36.
"Dispossession was substituted for disseisin. Sec. 3.
' Sec. 39.
'"Sec. ii.
'" See Hammond's note 41, at p. 324 to 2 Blackstone, Commentaries (Ham-
mond's ed. 18go) 195. See the earlier part of the same note for Hammond's
argument that the terms right of possession and right of property may still be
useful notwithstanding the loss of their old technical significance.
'" This has been remedied somewhat by the courts in holding that the statute
will not run unless there is someone in whose favor it can run. See supra p. 6.
.See supra p. 9.
'"Langdell, Equity Pleading, sec. 125.
'"Ibid.
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It declared that the possession of the younger brother should not be
deemed the possession of the heir15 nor the possession by one co-owner
of the entirety the possession of the other.151 Tenancy at sufferance
was no longer to stand in the way of the running of the statute and for
this purpose a tenancy at will which had not sooner determined was
deemed to have terminated one year from its commencement,152 and a
tenancy from year to year at the end of the first year or the last payment
of rent.1 58 That one had a right of action for forfeiture or breach of
condition, however, was not to prevent the statute commencing to run
again on the natural termination of the particular estate,1 54 except where
there was a written lease reserving a yearly rent of twenty shillings and
the tenant paid this rent to a person wrongfully claiming to be entitled
thereto. In such a case the statute commenced to run once and for
all from the first payment of rent to the wrongful claimant.' 55 The
mortgagee was to be cut off twenty years after the last payment or
acknowledgment.1 6 Suits in equity were to be subject to the same
limitation as actions at law.357 The statute had the advantage of being
definite and detailed on a great many points so that little was left to
general theory. Moreover, the running of the statute was made to
depend in general on facts that were fairly easy to ascertain, and the
importance of the character in which or the intention with which posses-
sion had been taken was greatly diminished. 5 s The statute would not
run in favor of a servant or bailiff, and for this purpose a parent or
other near relative entering on the land of an infant came to be regarded
as a bailiff, 59 but this was merely to require the intention or character
generally deemed essential to possession. And while no mere trespass
would amount to a dispossession,'6 0 yet this was more a matter of ouster
than of intent. Except for the delay in cases of concealed fraud, 6 '
therefore, the statute was admirably adopted for the cutting off of stale
claims whatever its shortcomings as a statute of repose, and with little
other change than the reduction of the term of limitation from twenty
to twelve years has remained in force till the present time.
The ruthless cutting off of stale claims which marked the English
Act of 1833 was in sharp contrast to the attitude taken by the early







15 Sec. 40; (1837) i Vict. c. 28.
Sec. 24.
'Pollock and Wright, Possession (1888) go.
' Lightwood, Possession, 182.
', Pollock and Wright, loc. cil. supra note 158.
181Ibid.; Lightwood, Possession, 245.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
were no less impressed by the obscurities of disseisin and disseisin at
election 1 62 than the drafters of the English act, but the abundance of
vacant land and the multiplicity of disputed titles inclined them to favor
the regular title whether accompanied by possession or not, and they
found a way out of the obscurities of the old law not by minimizing the
character in which, or the intention with which the land was held, but by
emphasizing and rationalizing it. Every presumption was indulged in
favor of the owner 63 and the doctrine of Reading v. Royston'6 that
"where two men are in possession, the law will adjudge it in him that
hath right" was extended into the doctrine that possession follows title
until an adverse possession is clearly made out.'8 5
In England the doctrine of Reading v. Royston had applied where
there was a struggle for the control of the premises and meant that
where the physical control was in the balance the presumption was with
the owner."" In New York, however, the mental element in adverse
possession received little, if any, less attention than the physical. The
importance of the quo animo was constantly reiterated 6 7 and Kent,
C. J., took the doctrine of Reading v. Royston' 68 to be the equivalent of
the rule which he said had been frequently recognized by the New York
court, "that an entry not appearing to be hostile, was to be considered
an entry under the title of the true owner."' 6 9  It became a common-
place in the New York decisions that possession was presumed to be in
subordination to the true title 70 and the burden of proving it adverse
' See the remarks of Kent, C. J., in New York, Smith v. Burtis (18io) 6
Johns. 197; of Tilghman, C. J., in Pennsylvania, Overfield v. Christie (1821)
7 Serg. & R. 173; and of Shaw, C. J., in Massachusetts, Sumner v. Stevens
(1843) 6 Metc. 337.
'Jackson v. Sharp (1812, N. Y.) g Johns. 163; Jackson v. Waters (1815,
N. Y.) 12 Johns 365; Rung v. Shoneberger (1833, Pa.) 2 Watts, 23; Lund v.
Parker (1824) 3 N. H. 49.
16 (1702, Q. B.) 2 Salk. 423.
165 Jackson v. Sellick (1811, N. Y.) 8 Johns. 2o2; Van Brunt v. Schenck
(1814, N. Y.) ii Johns. 377, 385; Barr v. Gratz's Heirs (819, U. S.) 4 Wheat.
213; U. S. v. Arredondo (1832, U. S.) 6 Pet. 691, 743; Hawk v. Senseman,
(182o, Pa.) 6 Serg. & R. 21.
'" See Lightwood, Possession, 36, and Pollock and Wright, Possession
(1888) 24.
'Smith v. Burtis (x812) 9 Johns. 174; Jackson v. Thomas (18iq) 16 Johns.
293; Jackson v. Newton (1820) 18 Johns. 355; La Frombois v. Jackson (1826)
8 Cow. 589; Livingston v. Peru Iron Co. (1832, N. Y. Senate) 9 Wend. 511;
Humbert v. Trinity Church (I84O, N. Y. Senate) 24 Wend. 587, 61i.
." Kent's reference to that doctrine is its statement by Holt, C. J., in Anonymous
(17o6, Q. B.) i Salk. 246, where the latter says :--"A bare entry on another
without an expulsion, makes such a seisin only that the law will adjudge him in
possession that has the right. .. ."
'Smith v. Burtis (i8io) 6 Johns. 197.
'Jackson v. Parker (18o2) 3 Johns. Cas. 124; Jackson v. Bowen (1803) 1
Cai. 358; Jackson v. Todd (1804) 2 Cai. 182; Smith v. Burtis (181o) 6 Johns.
197; Jackson v. Sharp (1812) 9 Johns. 163; Jackson v. Waters (ISI5) 12 Johns.
365; Jackson v. Thomas (3819) 16 Johns. 293.
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was thrown on the claimant.17 ' Kent's colleague, Spencer, seems to
have gone somewhat further than Kent himself in this matter and to
have insisted that to overcome the presumption it was necessary to show
a claim of title or right inconsistent with the title of the true owner.
72
He sometimes used the expression 'claim and color of title.' What he
had in mind apparently was a conflict between titles and an occupation
under one of them, a real dispute as to the right to the land. He was
probably not using color of title to mean a written instrument, but in
Chief Justice Gibson's sense
173 of a bona fide claim of right. Spencer's
successor, Savage, C. J., did go so far as to require good faith,
7 4 but, as
we have seen,' 75 a few years later, in 184o, the New York Court for
the Correction of Errors definitely repudiated the requirement of good
faith, but continued to insist on the necessity of a claim of right not
"the intent to claim honestly; but the intent to claim at all, right or
wrong, with or without knowledge that another has title.'
76
The influence of these early New York cases has been very great.
Claim and color of title became claim or color of title and the requisites
for adverse possession under each, with the presumption that possession
is held in subordination to the true title, were embodied in the New
York Revised Statutes of 18281
7
7 and have passed since into the statute
law of ten states. 78 But more important than the influence of the New
York cases on the statutory law'
79 has been their influence on the law of
the courts. The cases in Johnson's Reports were cited everywhere
and were recognized as having the greatest authority.
8 0 In Ricard v.
Williams, Mr. Justice Story took similar ground when he said that the
law "will consider every possession lawful, the commencement and
continuance of which is not proved to be wrongful. And this upon
the plain principle, that every man shall be presumed to act in
obedience to his duty, until the contrary appears. When, therefore,
a naked possession is in proof, unaccompanied by evidence as to its
origin, it will be deemed lawful, and co-extensive with the right set up
'In addition to the cases cited in the preceding note see Brandt v. Ogden
(I8o6) 1 Johns. 156; Jackson v. Sellick (i8i) 8 Johns. 202.
'Jackson v. Todd (1804) 2 Cai. 182; Brandt v. Ogden (18o6) i Johns. 356;
Smith v. Burtis (1812) 9 Johns. 174; Jackson v. Thomas (18ig) 16 Johns. 293;
Jackson v. Newton (382o) 18 Johns. 355.
lM'Call v. Neely (841, Pa.) 3 Watts, 69, 72.
11' Livingston v. Peru Iron Co. (1832) 9 Wend. 511.
' Supra note 78.1 1'Humbert v. Trinity Church, 24 Wend. 587, 61o.
' Part III, ch. 4, tit. 2, art. i, now ch. 4, tit. I, C. C. P. 1912.
1 California, Florida, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Utah and Wisconsin.
" In North Carolina and South Carolina, however, the New York statute
seems to have been received with reluctance and in Wisconsin to have been
largely nullified. See cases cited infra note 182.
ISO See the remarks of Williams, C. J., in Ives v. Hitlet (384o) 32 Vt. 314, 335,
quoted in Wallace, The Reporters (4th ed. 1882) 579 note i.
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by the party 1 1 With rare exceptions,18 2 the presumption that posses-
sion is not adverse but is in subordination to the legal title has been
accepted throughout the United States and -the burden of proving
possession adverse placed on the claimant.1 83 In 1819, Washington,
J., questioned the necessity of claim or color of title8 and occasionally
there has been a tendency to treat the statute as in England as running
wherever one has subjected himself to an action of ejectment,8 5 but
even in Connecticut, where the necessity of claim of title has been
expressly repudiated, it is rather the phrase "claim of title" that has
been rejected than the thing it stands for elsewhere, for the Connecticut
courts have insisted that for the statute to run the possessor must take
possession of the land as if it were his own.
188
The requirement that the possessor have the mind of the owner, the
intention to hold as owner or to acquire ownership, in order that his
181 (1822, U. S.) 7 Wheat. 59, 107.
In view of the prevalence in the United States of presumptions of owner-
ship and title and of seisin in fee in favor of the possessor as against a wrong-
doer or a subsequent possessor, it is surprising but significant that these pre-
sumptions have prevailed so little where the statute of limitations has been
relied on as against a prior possessor or the owner, for had they so prevailed,
the presumption would be that possession is adverse and the path of the adverse
possessor would be much easier. Tiffany indeed argues in favor of a presump-
tion that possession is adverse and cites what authority there is in support of
his position (2 Real Property [2d ed. I92O] 1934 note 53), but a number of his
cases merely hold that possession for the statutory period, apparently as owner,
makes out a prima facie caso of adverse possession, and not that possession alone
does so, while in five of the states whose decisions he cites (New York, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Utah and Wisconsin), the provision of the New York
Code that possession shall be deemed in subordination to the true title is in
force. In North Carolina that provision is now definitely accepted by the
courts (see Monk v. Wilmington [19o4] 137 N. C. 322, 49 S. E. 345; Land Co.
v. Floyd [1916] IVi N. C. 543, 88 S. E. 862), and the same thing appears to be
true in South Carolina (see Carr v. Mowzon [i9io] 86 S. C. 461, 68 S. E 66I).
In Wisconsin, on the other hand, the opinions of Marshall, J., have tended to
make the New York provision practically meaningless (see Illinois Steel Co. v.
Budzisz [igool io6 Wis. 499, 81 N. W. 1O27, 82 N. W. 534) although in
one of the latest of these (Ovig v. Morrison [igio] 142 Wis. 243, 125 N. W.
449) claim of title seems to be required to make out even a prima facie
case of adverse possession which would be in harmony with the ordinary accepta-
tion of the provision in question. In the overwhelming number of cases in the
United States the presumption has been in favor of the owner against the
wrongful possessor. (See citations, infra note 183.)
1832 C. J. 588 and notes. See also Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o) 1935
note 55.
'.SPotts v. Gilbert (1819, C. C. D. Pa. & N. J.) 3 Wash. 475.
' Campau v. Dubois (1878) 39 Mich. 274; Illinois Steel Co. v. Budzisz (igoo)
io6 Wis. 499, 81 N. W. 1O27, 82 N. W. 534; Rupley . Fraser (1916) 132 Minn.
311, 156 N. W. 35o. And see Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 1937 note 6o.
'Bryan v. Atwater (1811) 5 Day, 18i; French v. Pearce (1831) 8 Conn. 439,
442; Johnson v. Gorham (1871) 38 Conn. 513; Carney v. Hennessey (191o) 74
Conn. 1O7, 49 AtL. 91o. Huntington v. Whaley (186o) 29 Conn. 391, 398, in requir-
ing that the possessor should claim the land as his own is criticised in Johnson v.
Gorham, supra.
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possession ripen into ownership by the lapse of time seems so natural
from the point of view of affirmative prescription and the substantive
law of property that once adverse possession is recognized primarily as
affirmative prescription, rather than as a special phase of the limitation
of actions, some such requirement as claim of title seems almost
inevitable.18 7  Thus when the contemporaries of Kent and Spencer in
North Carolina had come to the conclusion that their act of 1715 was
not like the Statute of James I but was in effect an act of prescription,
they went so far as to require color of title to make the statute run.
88
But in the United States as a whole it was claim of title that preceded
prescription and not prescription claim of title, or perhaps it would be
better to say that claim of title was one of those underlying ideas of
prescription that gained recognition in connection with adverse posses-
sion before the full prescriptive character of adverse possession was
itself recognized and that it did much to bring about that recognition.
It is significant that the leading case' 9 in this country to require
continuity of possession for the running of the statute and the earliest
one commonly cited for the requirement of privity of estate in tack-
ing 90 was also one of the first to require a hostile claim of title. The
requirement of claim of title or right, however, was no conscious innova-
tion. It was an attempt to analyze what was meant by the requirement
that possession should be adverse. This might mean that the possessor
himself was hostile and meant to oust the owner from the land, or it'
might mean that there were conflicting claims and that the possessor
held under one of these. The former was negative, the latter was
positive. It was the latter view that the American courts under the
influence of the New York judges and Mr. Justice Story adopted,'
9'
but they flirted with the former and have yet cause to regret it.
in The statement of Holmes, J., in Bond v. O'Gara (i9oo) 177 Mass. 139, 58
N. E. 275, that "it is elementary law that adverse possession which will ripen
into a title must be under a claim of right" shows the natural correlation between
claim of right or title as an element of adverse possession and the acquisition
of title by adverse possession, and this statement is typical of many others. See,
for instance, the cases briefed in i5 L. R. A. (N. s.) 12O0 et seq.
' The case of Stanley v. Turner (1804) i Murph. 14, definitely established
it as law in North Carolina that seven years possession without color of title
was not sufficient to bar the plaintiff in ejectment and this is said by the reporter
to have been based on the observations of former Judge Haywood which are
included in a note. After concluding that the statute was intended to cut off
all claims, including the writ of right, and to vest in the possessor the absolute
dominion forever (pp. 26-28), Judge Haywood argued that this could never
have been intended of naked possessions, unaccompanied by deeds or grants
(pp. 28-29).
'"Brandt v. Ogden (i8o6, N. Y.) I Johns. i56.
See Ames, 3 Select Essays, at p. 577 note 3.
mTiffany concedes that "it has been asserted, by perhaps most of the courts
in this country, that in order that the statute of limitations may run in favor of
one in possession of land, the possession must be under claim of right or title."
2 Real Property (2d ed. I92O) 1936. See also 2 C. J. 125, and i5 L. L A.
(r. s.) 1208.
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No one can help regret the vast amount of needless litigation over the
title to boundary strips long held by the adjoining owner under a
mistake as to the boundary line. Even in a single jurisdiction the cases
are a source of confusion rather than of enlightenment. They furnish
a striking example of the harm wrought by carrying over into a field
where they have-properly no application, principles which in their own
field are sound enough. Bracton would have relieved from tort
liability in 'novel disseisin one who had entered on another's land
through inadvertence or mistake.192 The judges in Blunden v.
Baugh 9 3 were loath to invalidate family settlements where no disseisin
had been intended. A similar motive led the judges in Brown v. Gay'94
to hold valid the transfer of a strip of land notwithstanding it may have
been at the time inadvertently in the occupation of the adjoining owner.
But none of these situations concerned the effect of long possession and
to make a man benefit by the deliberate intention to oust another from
his property and a fortiori, to make the possessor's acquisition of title
depend upon such intention, is quite a different thing. Such was the
result however where adverse possession under the statute was identified
with disseisin, for it was these more enlightened authorities that were
looked to as expressing the true doctrine of disseisin, and they required
an express intention to oust the old owner. 95 Such an intent was a
very proper element of a tort, but it was entirely out of place in
acquisitive prescription. If honesty was not to be required for the
latter, at least there was no reason for placing a premium on dishonesty.
Accordingly it was soon seen that to deny the running of the statute
wherever a boundary strip was held by mistake was going too far. 98
' Brac. fol. 216 b.
... (1632, K. B.) Cro. Car. 302.
.. (1824, Me.) 3 Greenl. 126.
"' A belated example of making the old intention to disseise a requirement of
adverse possession under the statute is afforded by the statement in Ousts v.
McKnight (1920) 114 S. C. 303, io3 S_ E. 561, that "adverse possession is hostile
possession, and hostile possession is possession with intention to dispossess the
owner. 3 Washburn (4th Ed.) p. 129." Perhaps the best known case express-
ing-a similar view is Grube v. Wells (871) 34 Iowa, 148. The cases showing
the more immediate influence of disseisin are collected in 2 C. J. 139 note 62.
'Thus in Worcester v. Lord (1868) 56 Me. 265, it was said :--"An involun-
tary trespass may occur, but an unintentional disseizin is an anomaly. Yet, in
saying this, we are not to be understood as laying down the doctrine that, to
constitute a disseizin, the intention of the disseizor must of necessity, in all
cases, be wrongfully to possess himself of property, known to him to belong
to another. The animus furandi (if that phrase could properly be applied to
a wrongful appropriation of real estate) or Ahab's wicked intention to seize
as his own the vineyard of his neighbor, is not essential. Cases not unfrequently
do arise where the disseizin is innocently committed under a mistake as to the
validity of the title, but the title must be asserted. Cases may arise where a
man may be under a mistake as to the true extent of his domain, yet, if he
intentionally claims title to all which he has in possession, his neighbors may be
barred, by lapse of time, from asserting their rights. The point is here,-a man
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It was admitted that there might be claim of title notwithstanding a
mistake, but it was said that there "must be an intention to claim title
to all land within a certain boundary on the face of the earth, whether it
shall eventually be found to be the correct one or not.' 9 7  This is in
effect to require a conditional intention to oust the true owner if a
mistake shall appear. As such an intent is hardly likely to exist where
no mistake is dreamed of, and is hypothetical where the fact of mistake
has been raised but not settled, to make it material to the acquisition of
title to property is merely to make a bad matter worse. Whatever the
defects of requiring an absolute intention to disseise, such a requirement
was at least workable. But either the absolute or conditional intent to
oust the old owner would seem entirely non-essential to prescriptive
acquisition. Both are directly traceable to the old disseisin and are the
outstanding example of how badly the attempt to read disseisin into
adverse possession works.
It is in the attempt to get away from these consequences of the old
disseisin that the requirement of a claim of title for adverse possession
has been subjected to its severest strain. Technically, title signifies the
investitive facts of a right, such as a conveyance or a descent cast, rather
than the right itself,' 98 and if title were used in this sense in the expres-
sion claim of title, the claim would be directed towards some particular
means of acquiring ownership, such as a deed or a will, and would only
indirectly involve a claim of ownership. Claim of title would then
mean claim of a title and that title would naturally be looked to to ascer-
tain the extent of the titled possession. It is believed that the courts
which have been led to indulge in the presumption that the claim of
title is in accordance with the deed have been at least unconsciously
influenced by this possible meaning of claim of title, and they have this
in their justification that such was probably the sense in which claim of
title was first used in connection with the statute of limitations.
9 9 In
this sense it is hardly distingishable from what we mean today by
color of title. But claim of title soon got away from this meaning
unless in connection with boundary disputes and came to mean claim of
right or ownership, or the intention to acquire ownership, or to hold as
owner,20 0 and it is believed that it is this meaning that it should have
claiming title only to a specified line, capable of being ascertained, cannot, by
ignorantly having possession up to another line, acquire a title by disseizin, to
land lying between the two which he does not intentionally claim."
... Preble v. Maine Central Ry. (1893) 85 Me. 26o, 27 Atl. 149. The trend
of the more recent cases is noticed in 3 Gray, Cases on Property (2d ed. i9o6)
65 note. For an exhaustive collection of cases showing the more modern
tendency see 2 C. 3. 141 note 68.
Salmond, Jurisprudence (6th ed. 192o) 299.
' See the cases cited supra note 172.
The change is seen in the New York cases, supra p. 148. And see Sedgwick
and Wait, Trial of Title to Land (2d ed. i886) sec. 756, quoted by Holmes, J.,
in Bond v. O'Gara (igoo) 177 Mass. 139, 58 N. E. 275.
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in boundary disputes as well. That claim of title does not necessarily
mean an express assertion of title is generally agreed.
2 ' It has been
said that here as elsewhere actions speak even louder than words.
20 2
The question remains, however, which is the land the possessor claims
and intends to hold as owner, the land described in the deed, or that
which he is actually occupying. As long as the mistake continues, he
is unaware that there is any difference between the two. There is a
conflict in intentions and the law must choose between the two. It is
here that Mr. Justice Holmes' suggestion is so helpful that the law
should choose the intention directed towards the physical object rather
than the intention to hold in accordance with the deed.
203 Even with
this suggestion to guide us however, it is still necessary to determine
what will be sufficient to indicate claim of title to the strip in question.
A few courts apparently would hold that no further evidence of claim
of title or intention to hold as owner is necessary than where the posses-
sor is not an adjoining owner but is clearly an interloper,
20 ' but mistakes
as to boundary are so natural and so frequent, and adjoining owners are
so proverbially careless about them, that the great majority of courts in
requiring something more than in the ordinary -case would seem to be
instinctively right. Where such an extreme act of ownership as the
erection of a house is involved it would seem that it evidences a claim of
ownership without cavil,20 5 and so of a wall or fence elaborate enough
to indicate that it is not likely to have been placed there unless it was
distinctly claimed as the boundary line.208 On the other hand the mere
enclosure of a neighbor's strip with a make shift fence intended for the
convenience of the builder and enough in the ordinary case to indicate
adverse possession may well be held insufficient to indicate to a
neighboring owner a deliberate intention to claim title to the disputed
strip. Many of the courts which have been most inclined against find-
ing adverse possession in these cases have tended to this result in holding
that acquiescence in a line evidently intended as a boundary line for the
statutory peiiod will be conclusive, 20 7 although they have sometimes
3M12 C. J. 128.
Rude v. Marshall (1917) 54 Mont. 27, 31, 166 Pac. 298.
Bond v. O'Gara, supra note 2oo.
"' See the cases cited !n 2 C. J. I39 note 61. Possibly some of the cases cited
in 2 C. J. note 68 might also be included. A number of them are so cited by
2 Tiffany, Real Property, (2d ed. 1920) 1946 note go.
' See the cases cited in 33 L. R. A. (x. s.) 934 note. But see contra:
Wacha v. Brown (889) 78 Iowa, 432, 43 N. W. 269; Winn v. Abeles (1886)
35 Kan. 85, io Pac. 443; Kirkman v. Brown (1894) 93 Tenn. 476, 27 S. W. 7o9.
The great extension of the doctrine that acquiescence in a boundary line
for the statutory period will definitely establish it as the true line would seem
to be a subconscious recognition of the fallacy lying behind much that has been
said in denial of adverse possession by mistake.
The authorities on acquiescence in a boundary line for the statutory period
are collected in 2 C. J. 137 note 42.
DISSEISIN AND ADVERSE POSSESSION
distinguished this from adverse possession.20 8 A tremendous amount
of useless litigation would be swept away if the law on this matter were
to be restated free from the complexities of secret intents derived from
the law of disseisin and along the rational lines of claim of title. It is
believed that the result would not be very far different from the law in
force in most jurisdictions today,20 9 but such a restatement of the law
would be a guide whereas the law as at present stated is little more than
a stumbling block.
A mistake of a different character is where one enters on what he
supposes is government land with intent to acquire title under the land
laws and later discovers that the title is not in the government but in a
private individual. His holding is much more meritorious than if he
had known the real facts and to hold that such a possession with the
avowed intention of acquiring ownership should not be equally as effec-
tive in conferring title as if he had been an avowed usurper would be
strange indeed. And such seems to be the trend of authority.2 10  The
difficulty lies in finding a possession that is adverse or a claim of title.
There is clearly no intention to oust anyone nor is there a present claim
of ownership against the whole world, but possession may be adverse
without any consciously hostile intent and the intention to acquire title
is probably the predominant intent in most cases of adverse possession.
Claim of title is perhaps not a very happy phrase to express this intention
but claim of title has been the phrase used by the American courts to
indicate that the possessor must have the mind of the owner in order
to acquire title and no greater violence is done to its natural meaning
than is the case with most technical terms. The claim is in fact hostile
to all other claims than that of the government, although not consciously
SO.
2 11
This raises the question as to how broad the claim of title must be.
Some of the courts which have been willing to admit the supposed
entrant on government land an adverse possessor have made it a special
case because of the fact that even if the possession had been adverse to
the government the government's title would not have been affected;
" Iowa is a notable example of this. See (1921) 7 IowA L. BuL. 135.
The superabundance of cases arising out of long possession under mistake
as to boundary may be seen by a glance at the many citations in 2 C. J. 137 note
42, 139 note 62, and 141 note 68. Only by comparing the cases from a single
jurisdiction in all three notes can anything like an adequate idea of the law of
that jurisdiction in this matter be obtained.
=02 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o) 1943; 2 C. J. 130.
' Ladd, J., in Blumer v. Land Co. (9o5) 129 Iowa, 32, o5 N. W. 342, says:-
"The character of the claim under a government entry does not appear to have
been given due consideration. If effective, it is exclusive of others. It is an
assertion of right to the land, which, if well founded, must defeat the claims
of all others. It involves a right of possession as absolute as though the party
owned the title. It purports to exclude everyone from its enjoyment, and even
as against the government to assert the right to divest its title by compliance
with the law."
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and that therefore it was immaterial that the adverse claim did not
include the government, and have intimated that the claim of title
required in adverse possession must be against the whole world except
the government. 21.2  This is either on the ground that possession to be
adverse must be exclusive, and that the recognition of a right in another
prevents it from being exclusive,21 3 or that claim of title means claim
of ownership, and that ownership necessarily means absolute ownership,
that is, something good against the whole world.2 1 4  This conception of
ownership was that of the Roman law.21 5  It is also the popular concep-
tion and is in accord with the views expressed by Langdell on prescrip-
tion.216 On the other hand, relativity of ownership or title has always
had an appeal to the common law,217 and there is considerable authority
that it is sufficient for adverse possession that the claim be hostile to the
other party to the controversy, whether the true owner or a prior posses-
sor, though there may be a third party other than the government
whose superior title is acknowledged, and against whom the holding
is non-adverse.2 1 8  Thus a lease from a third party might estop the
possessor from claiming title against the lessor, while it would not be
conclusive that he was not claiming the title as against somebody else.2 1 9
But cases where A continues to claim the fee in his own right against
B, after taking a lease from C, are not likely to be common.
It is often said that the claim of title in adverse possession must be in
fee.220  This has been due perhaps in part to the identification of claim
of title with claim of ownership, but any such inference from such an
indefinite term as "title" would be unwarranted and is avoided by using
the alternative expression, "claim of title," or "right." It is true
that there are many expressions in the older books that a disseisin was
of necessity in fee, 221 and if this were so and the modern adverse
possession were the equivalent of the old disseisin, there would be
strong ground for saying that the claim of title in adverse possession
must be in fee; for it was laid down by Judge Story in Ricard v.
Williams 22 and has generally been accepted in the United States as
applicable to the statute of limitations, that the law will not attribute to a
mLord v. Sawyer (1880) 57 Calif. 65; Northern Pac. Ry. v. Pyle (191o) 19
Idaho, 3, 112 Pac. 678; Blumer v. Land Co., supra note 211; Maas v. Burdetzke
(19o4) 93 Minn. 295, Ioi N. W. 182.
'Altschul v. O'Neill (1899) 35 Or. 202, 221, 58 Pac. 95.
=" See cases cited 2 C. J. 129 note 96.
See Lightwood, Possession, 71.
"Equity Pleading, secs. 121, 125.
2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed. 1899) 77.
21 See cases cited in 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o) 1932 note 47a, and
in 2 C. J. 131 note 8.
'Mitchell z. McShane Lumber jo. (1915, C. C. A. 5th.) 22o Fed. 878.
' See cases cited in 2 C. J. 129 note 88.
See 2 Preston, Conveyancing (18o6) 313 et seq., and 2 Tiffany, Real Property
(2d ed. 1920) 1981.
(1822, U. S.) 7 Wheat. 59, 1O5-IO8.
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man a greater estate than he claims,2 3 so that if the estate gained is
necessarily a fee, the claim must be equally extensive. One difficulty
with this argument is that it is by no means clear that a disseisin was of
necessity in fee, and that in so far as it was of necessity in fee, this was
the result of the rule that a wrongdoer could not qualify his own wrong,
which was relegated by Judge Story to disseisin at election22 4 and hence
removed from the sphere of the statute of limitations and adverse
possession.
That disseisin was not of necessity in fee was elaborately argued by
Preston 225  He considered it proved "that a person who enters,
claihing a term, where there is such a term, or who enters claiming any
particular estate, where there is such particular estate, may become
tenant for that particular estate, by the dispossession of the termor or
disseisin of the owner of the particular estate; without divesting the
estate of the person, who has the reversion or remainder or committing
any wrong beyond the particular estate. 2 26  Where there was no
particular estate in existence, however, he would have applied the
doctrine that a wrongdoer cannot qualify his own wrong.227  He saw a
distinction in the authorities between the disseisin or dispossession of a
particular estate in esse and the creation of a particular estate de novo,
but if as it has been attempted to show, the American doctrine of adverse
possession is a doctrine of affirmative prescription, it would seem that
there should be no more difficulty about the second case than about the
first. In the old case of Reading v. Royston22 8 it was said that "a man
may be tenant in common by prescription, yet he may not be a tenant
in common by wrong; nor can a man be disseised of an undivided
moiety." If adverse possession is a positive title, it is not a case of an
estate by wrong or of apportioning a wrong, but of allowing the creation
of a limited estate by that title, in the same way as a tenancy in common
or an easement.229 There is adverse possession in such a case, but it is
'See Jackson v. Porter (1825, C. C. D. N. Y., Conn., & Vt.) i Paine, 457;
Bedell v. Shaw (1874) 59 N. Y. 46; Bond v. O'Gara (igoo) 177 Mass. 139, 58
N. E. 275; Tyler, Ejectment (1871) 7,; Sedgwick and Wait, Trial of Title to
Land (2d ed. 1886) 217; Ballantine, Claim of Title in Adverse Possession (1919)
28 YALE LAW JOuRNAL, 220; 2 C. J. 127.
'Ricard v. Williams, supra p. 156.
= 2 Conveyancing (18o6) 314 et seq.
'I bid. 321.
Ibid. 319, 322-323.
(1702, Q. B.) 2 Salk. 423.
As the only prescription known to the common law was immemorial there
was no chance for a prescriptive right to be gained either for or against a term
for years and in Wheaton v. Maple & Co. [1893, C. A.] 3 Ch. 48, it was held
that no presumption of a grant or covenant would be indulged in favor of such
limited right, but in Wallace v. Fletcher (1855) 3o N. H. 434, 453, it was said that
"the tenant for life or years may grant easements, or permit them to be acquired
by user, and they will be valid against himself and those who hold his estate
during its continuance, and perhaps not afterwards, where the reversioner had
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limited to the extent of the claim. This result would seem to be almost
necessary from the abandonment of the doctrine that a wrongdoer
cannot qualify his own wrong. If the one who is in wrongful posses-
sion for the statutory period claiming a term for years or a life estate
is not to have the fee, it would be jumping to just the opposite extreme
to give him nothing at all. The matter is of considerable importance
in the case of a void lease for a long term of years or for life, and
although the authority on the matter is slight it favors what would seem
to be the logical result from the prescriptive character of adverse
possession.280
(To be continued)
previously neither cause nor right to complain." It is submitted that with the
American adoption of the theory of a limited prescriptive period there is now no
difficulty in allowing the creation by prescription of easements for a limited time.
'Brown v. Issaquena County Supervisors (1876) 54 Miss. 230; Jones v.
Madison County (1895) 72 Miss. 777, 18 So. 87; Warren County v. Lamkin
(igo8) 93 Miss. 123, 46 So. 497. One of the most valuable parts of Professor
Ballantine's articles on adverse possession is his emphasis on this point, Claim of
Title in Adverse Possession (igig) 28 Y.AL. LAW JoURNAL, 222. See also NoTES
(198o) 22 HARv. L. REv. 138, but see 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 192o)
1983.
